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against-the railroad when the sole basis of his action is failure of the
railroad to provide safety devices which have not been prescribed by
the Highway Commission. Such a result appears to be entirely in-
consistent with the rule laid down in other states which have similar
statutes.19
- If the legislature did not intend to abolish the railroads' common-
law duties to erect safety devices at dangerous crossings, the best
possible remedy to the problem would be an amendment to G.S.
§ 136-20 by the legislature. It should specify that nothing in G.S.
§ 136-20 should be construed to absolve a railroad from any common-
law duty to the public, whether or not any action has been taken
by the Highway Commission under the powers granted by G.S.
§ 136-20.
ARcH K. ScftOcH IV
Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Doctrine of Exclusive Control
of the Instrumentality
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence applied
where, under the circumstances of the case, the mere fact that the
accident occurred is of itself circumstantial evidence of negligence on
the part of someone.1 In application of the doctrine to actual fact
situations the courts have developed certain "elements" which might
be termed conditions precedent to its invocation. These elements
1 57 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1202, Pennington v. Southern Pac. Co., 146
Cal. App. 2d 605, 304 P.2d 22 (1956); Jenson v. Southern Pac. Co., 129 Cal.
App. 2d 67, 276 P.2d 703 (1954) ; Lloyd v. Southern Pac. Co., 111 Cal. App.
2d 626, 245 P.2d 583 (1952); ILL. ANN. STAT. 111% § 62 (1954), Baltimore
& O.R.R. v. Felgenhauer, 168 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1948); Bales v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 347 Ill. App. 466, 107 N.E.2d 179 (1952); Lauer v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry.,
305 Ill. App. 200, 27 N.E.2d 315 (1940) ; Willett v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R.,
284 Ill. App. 307, 1 N.E.2d 748 (1936); Wagner v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 352
Ill. 85, 185 N.E. 236 (1933); 5 Mass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 160, § 147
(1959), Peterson v. Boston & M.R.R., 310 Mass. 45, 36 N.E.2d 701 (1941) ;
Mannino v. Boston & M.R.R., 300 Mass. 71, 14 N.E.2d 122 (1938) ; Hubbard
v. Boston & A.R.R., 162 Mass. 132, 38 N.E.2d 366 (1894); 49 Orio REv.
CODE ANN. § 4907.47 (Supp. 1961), Evans v. Erie R.R., 213 Fed. 129 (6th
Cir. 1914) ; 17 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 84 (1951), Slowik v. Chicago, M., St. P.
& Pac. R.R., 89 F. Supp. 590 (D. Minn. 1950); Kansas City So. Ry. v. State,
195 Okl. 424, 158 P.2d 699 (1945); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Prince, 145 Old.
194, 291 Pac. 973 (1930).
1 The Latin phrase "res ipsa loquitur" means "the thing speaks for itself."
It was first used in Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurl. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299
(Exch. 1863), although the idea that negligence could be proven by circum-
stantial evidence had existed prior to that time. PRossER, TORTS § 42, at 201
(2d ed. 1955).
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are: (1) the instrumentality causing the injury must be inherently
harmless;2 (2) the party charged must have had exclusive control
of the instrumentality at the time of the injury; and (3) there must
be no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff or third
parties.3
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wright v. Huntley
Furniture Co." was called upon to apply the North Carolina doctrine
of exclusive control. In this case the plaintiff was injured when he
opened the door of a sealed boxcar and was struck by a crate which
fell from the top of the cargo being shipped.' Since the boxcar had
2 If the instrumentality is inherently harmless, it is reasoned that any harm
resulting from the instrumentality would be caused more likely than not by
negligence in making or using it than by the thing itself. 9 WIGMoRE, Evi-
DENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940).
3 Wigmore states that the final shape of the elements cannot be so easily
predicted. They should be limited to: "(1) The apparatus must be such
that in the ordinary instance no injurious operation is to be expected unless
from a careless construction, inspection, or user; (2) Both inspection and
user must have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party
charged; (3) The injurious occurrence or condition must have happened
irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the party injured." The
justice of this doctrine seems to rest in the fact that evidence of the actual
negligence, if there is any, is often more accessible to the party charged
than to the party injured. 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2509, at 380-84 (3d ed.
1940). This is shown in Williams v. Field Transp. Co., 28 Cal. 2d 696, 116
P.2d 884 (1946), where a metal pipe rolled from a truck driven by the
defendant and injured the plaintiff. Defendant was presumed liable since
negligence was evident and the most logical conclusion was that the negli-
gence was defendant's. The court held that because of his superior knowl-
edge defendant must rebut the logical inference.
Note that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur concerns the presentation of
circumstantial evidence, whereby the plaintiff tries to infer negligence on
the part of the defendant. At no time need the plaintiff prove the specific
negligence of the defendant; indeed it has been held in some jurisdictions
that the attempt to do so will bar the use of the doctrine. See, e.g., Whitcher
v. Board of Educ., 233 App. Div. 184, -, 251 N.Y. Supp. 611, 612-13
(1931) where the court stated: "That doctrine does not apply in this case ....
'The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although it provides a substitute for direct
proof of negligence where plaintiff is unable to point out the specific act of
negligence which caused his injury, is a rule of necessity to be invoked only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available .... Hence the presumption or inference arising from the
doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has full knowl-
edge and testifies as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of
the injury complained of.' 45 C.J. 1206."
'299 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962).
'The shipment of goods was in interstate commerce and the injury
occurred in Massachusetts. Ordinarily, under these circumstances the law
of the state in which the injury occurred would control. However, in the
principal case both parties agreed that the Massachusetts rules of negligence,
contributory negligence, and damages were the same as the North Carolina
rules. The cases cited in support of the exclusive control theory were North
[Vol. 41
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been under the control of the shipper at the. time of loading and
sealing, the plaintiff brought action against the shipper on the theory
of res ipsa loquitur. Interference by a third party in this case would
have been impossible. The evidence clearly indicated that any negli-
gence could only have been that of the defendant. The court, how-
ever, held for the defendant under North Carolina law requiring
exclusive control by the defendant at the time of injury.6
Those jurisdictions which strictly apply the element of control
have interpreted the word "control" literally, requiring proof that
the defendant was in actual physical possession of the instrumentality
at the time of the injury.7 The reason for the element of exclusive
control is that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires the inferred
negligence to be more probably that of the defendant than of another..
When this basis is viewed in relation to the strict requirement of
control, it is readily seen that any attempt to apply the element
strictly to every factual situation without exception can do grave
injustice. In the most infamous example of its strict application a
customer was denied recovery where she entered defendant's store
and sat down in a chair which collapsed. It was decided by the court
that the plaintiff was in possession of the chair at the time of the
injury.9 Regardless of plaintiff's physical possession the logical in-
ference of defendant's negliffence is readily seen.
Many courts have become aware of the injustice which may occur
Carolina cases. Wright v. Huntley Furniture Co., 197 F. Supp. 117
(M.D.N.C. 1961). The court has recently restated its strict exclusive control
rule in Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 256 N.C. 728, 125 S.E.2d 30
(1962).
"At the time of the accident complained of, the shipment was under the
exclusive control of the plaintiff and his employer. The doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur does not apply 'when the instrumentality causing the injury is not
under the exclusive control or management of the defendant.' Lane v.
Dorney, 250 N.C. 15, 108 S.E.2d 55 (1959)." 299 F.2d at 906.
"These jurisdictions include Colorado, Iowa, Massachusettts, Mississippi,
North Carolina and Rhode Island. See Hansen v. Phagan, 146 Colo. 484,
361 P.2d 977 (1961); Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321
(1961); Banaghan v. Dewey, 340 Mass. 73, 162 N.E.2d 807 (1959); Denman
v. Denman, 242 Miss. 59, 134 So. 2d 457 (1961) ; Springs v. Doll, 197 N.C.
240, 148 S.E. 251 (1929) ; Coia v. Eastern Concrete Prods. Co., 85 R.I. 128,
127 A.2d 858 (1956). See generally 38 Am. JuR. Negligence § 300 (1941).
82 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs § 19.7, at 1085 (1956). See also Moms,
TORTS § 8, at 133 (1953). Other causes need not be altogether eliminated.
Rocona v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 173 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1949). Their prob-
ability need be only reduced to such a degree as to point the finger at the
party charged. Mintzer v. Wilson, 21 Cal. App. 2d 85, 68 P.2d 370 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1937).
Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 Atl. 720 (1932).
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through the use of the strict element of control. Some have created
exceptions to the basic strict rule while others have reshaped the
element of control itself. Generally, these departures have been
designed to meet fact situations in which- it is evident the strict rule
will not be reliable.
The most just approach discards the idea of control altogether,
and requires only "that the apparent cause of the accident must be
such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence
connected with it."'" The plaintiff must indicate negligence on the
part of someone and a resulting injury to himself. He then proves
the absence of intervening factors and contributory negligence. 1 By
following a process of elimination he removes everyone but the
defendant.1 2 He must also introduce evidence which shows that the
apparent cause of the accident is such that the defendant would be
responsible for it.1 3 In -jurisdictions which adopt this application of
res ipsa loquitur exclusive control by the party charged ceases to be
a prerequisite element and becomes merely one factual method of
" PROSSER, ToRTs § 42, at 206 (2d ed. 1955). See Stolle v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 307 ILfo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925); Sasso v. Randforce Amuse-
ment Corp., 243 App. Div. 552, 275 N.Y. Supp. 891 (1934); Minotti v. State,
7 Misc. 2d 252, 166 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Ct. Cl. 1957) ; Leach v. Joyce Prods. Co.,
66 Ohio L. Abs. 296, 116 N.E.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1952) ; Fick v. Pilsener Brew-
ing Co., 39 Ohio Op. 158, 86 N.E.2d 616 (C.P. 1948).
" See Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 339 Mass. 177, 158 N.E.2d
342 (1959); Rinkel v. Lee's Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 14, 99
N.W.2d 779 (1959), 59 Mica. L. REv. 136 (1960); Ryan v. Zweck-Wollen-
berg Co., 226 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954).." Since of every effect there is a cause, where negligence exists, some
one must have been the responsible author .... Inferentially some one was
negligent .... By a process of elimination we get back to the manufacturer,
who set the dangerous agency in motion, and upon whom the blame ought
inferentially to be fastened." Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga.
App. 762, 763, 73 S.E. 1087, 1088 (1912).
1 PROSSER, ToRTs § 42, at 206 (2d ed. 1955). This approach seems
to be an expansion of the third element of res ipsa loquitur. See note 3 supra
and accompanying text. From the proof of this element, plus the introduction
of circumstances which point to the defendant, his negligence becomes
apparent. This method of proof might have brought about a different
answer on the question of defendant's negligence in the principal case, since
(a) there was an accident which would indicate negligence on the part of
someone; (b) the plaintiff was injured; (c) and since the boxcar was sealed,
negligence on the part of the railroad was disproved; (d) thus by elimination,
the possibility of negligence was narrowed to the plaintiff and defendant.
The court concluded from further evidence that defendant was not guilty of
negligence of any sort; however, plaintiff was found guilty of contributory
negligence. 299 F.2d at 907 (1962). Quaere: Is contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff possible without original negligence on the part
of the defendant? A finding of negligence under res ipsa loquitur would
have reconciled the later holding of contributory negligence.
[Vol. 41
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establishing the necessary circumstantil evidence.'4  This more
flekible rule has been applied to such varied subject matter as ex:
pl6ding bottles,' sealed containers holding foreign matter,' 6 faucets,' 7
d ih.ahite, 8 appliandes,' 9 and exploiting heaters and oil burners.20
.A few courts have used the above approach to go one step farther.
Until recently it was thought that there could not be multiple de-
fendants in cases where res ipsa loquitur was used.2 ' The reasoning
was based on the fact that where there is more than one defendant,
the instrumentality could not have been in the "exclusive control" of
any one of them.2 2 However, where the courts have abandoned the
requirement of actual physical possession they have found that res
ipsa loquitur can be more fully implemented. Once this was accom-
plished .the courts felt it necessary to permit multiple defendants.
"' Thus, where the plaintiff was shocked by a refrigerator which she had
owned for almost three years she was allowed to recover from the manu-
facturer when she showed that there was no intervening negligence on the
part of third parties which could have caused the 'short circuit, and proved
the faulty wiring was in a component part which was sealed at the factory.
Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenburg, Co., 226 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954).
1" Florence Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 259 Ala. 56, 65 So. 2d 169
(1953); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hicks, 215 Ark. 803, 223 S.W.2d 762
(1949); Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 344
(1952) ; Hughs v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 155 Fla. 299, 19 So. 2d 862
(1944); Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d
601 (1941); Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 235 Minn. 471, 51 N.W.2d
573 (1952); Honea v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968
(1944) ; Ferrell v' Royal Crown Bottling Co., 144 W. Va. 465, 109 S.E.2d 489
(1959).
1" Rutherford v. Huntington Coco-Cola Bottling Co., 142 W. Va. 681, 97
S.E.2d 803 (1957), 60 W. VA. L. REV. 110 (glass in bottle under control of
the plaintiff).
17Minotti v. State, 7 Misc. 2d 252, 166 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Ct. CI. 1957), 7
BUFFALO L. REV. 330 (1958) (no mixing valve on hot and cold water faucets
being used in a school for the blind).
18 Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960)
(Texas law applied) (stick of dynamite exploded while in plaintiff's posses-
sion).
18 Peterson v. Minnesota P. & L. Co., 207 Minn. 387, 291 NAV. 705 (1940)
I(electrical shock from stove).
Chandler v. Automatic Heating, Inc., 40 Ga. App. 280, 149 S.E. 287
(1929); Plunkett v. United Elec. Serv., 214 La. 145, 36 So. 2d 704 (1948);
Peterson v. Minnesota P. & L. Co., 207 Minn. 387, 291 N.W. 705 (1940);
Schafer v. Wells, 171 Ohio St. 506, 172 N.E.2d 708 (1961), 30 U. Ci-N. L.
REV. 543; Rafferty v. Northern Util. Co., 73 Wyo. 287, 278 P.2d 605 (1955).
"1 Sanders v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Tex. 1939);
Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry., 134 Cal. 549, 66 Pac. 787 (1901); Wolf v.
American Tract Soc'y, 164 N.Y. 30, 58 N.E. 31 (1900). See generally
Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 905 (1954).
"' See Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. Central R.R., 216 Fed. 72, 79 (2d Cir.
1914).
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This seems to have resulted for two different reasons: (1) the courts
realize that it may be possible for a plaintiff to suffer injury from the
concurring negligence of two or more parties, thus creating the
difficulty of apportioning damages ;3 (2) the plaintiff cannot in every
case pick the negligent party from several persons who may have had
control. 4 It is foreseeable the plaintiff might know that several per-
sons had some control over the instrumentality. Because of evi-
dentiary problems25 he may decide to join them all as defendants,
relying on the court to require them to prove their own innocence.
The problem then becomes how many potential defendants plaintiff
should be allowed to join.2" Looking at the problem solely from
the plaintiff's point of view it is sufficient for present purposes to
say the more defendants which are joined the weaker the inference of
actionable negligence by any one defendant becomes. There is a
point where that inference ceases to exist and res ipsa loquitur will
not be available to the plaintiff. Thus, he must weigh the availability
of evidence against the desire to use the doctrine.
21
"3 See Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir.
1960) (Texas law applied). A driller injured by an exploding blasting cap
was allowed to use the doctrine against three separate manufacturers who
made the component parts.
" Thus, where a patient was injured while under sedation, and evidence
showed that he was under the care of several parties at different times, each
of the defendants was called upon to prove his innocence. Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). This case provoked ex-
tensive comment. See, e.g., 40 ILL. L. REv. 421 (1946); 18 So. CAL. L. Rxv.
310 (1945). For the application of res ipsa loquitur to malpractice cases, see
generally Klein v. Arnold, 203 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Pendergraft
v. Royster, 203 N.C. 384, 166 S.E. 285 (1932); Davis v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351,
86 Atl. 1007 (1913) ; Dux v. Shaver, 105 Pa. Super. 344, 161 Atl. 481 (1932).
" These problems may disturb either party in an action at law. Certain
defendants may find it impossible to show their innocence. If indiscriminate
joinder is allowed parties actually innocent may find themselves held liable
due to the inability to prove it. On the other hand plaintiffs often labor under
an impossible burden of proving negligence from facts inaccessible to them.
The difficulty of weighing these two possibilities may be afactor retarding
the acceptance of this approach by more jurisdictions.
" In allowing joinder of these defendants the courts have to consider the
existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff, as well as
other requirements of the jurisdiction concerning joinder, such as concert of
action, concurrence of the negligent acts, separability of injuries, etc. Ex-
tensive exploration of the problem of separating defendants from the point of
view of the court is beyond the scope of this note.
"' Note that the inference created from the evidence will not carry against
everyone who had control, e.g., in the principal case the boxcar being sealed
would negative any inference of negligence on the part of the railroad com-
pany. This arises from the fact that the type of control which the railroad
had was not that type of control which would allow it to either apply its own
negligence to the instrumentality or to alter any negligence of the shipper.
[Vol. 41
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Other innovations in the use of the element of control are nothing
more than exceptions. The first of these has been styled the "right
to control" maxim.2" It does not require that the instrumentality be
under the actual physical control of the defendant, but refers to his
right to control from the time of the alleged negligence to the time
of the injury.' This creates another problem since it applies only
where the defendant's legal relation to the instrumentality is such
that he alone has the right of possession and control. ° It would be
of little value in deciding cases in which a third party or plaintiff had
not only possession but ownership as well.3 1 A second exception
has been made which answers the problem created by complexities
of title. In this exception the control required does not refer to
control at the time of the injury, but to control at the time of the
alleged negligent act.3 2 This approach is illustrated by the case of
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.3 where a waitress was injured
when a bottle of carbonated drink broke in her hand. In Escola the
defendant company argued that the bottle was not in its possession or
ownership at the time of the injury, therefore recovery on the ground
of res ipsa loquitur was not available to the plaintiff. The court
answered that the doctrine may be applied on the theory that the
defendant had control at the time of the negligent act, although not
" "[T]he requirement that the instrumentality be under the management
and control of the defendant does not mean . . . actual physical control, but
refers rather to the right of control at the time the negligence was com-
mitted." McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 535, 46 S.W.2d 557, 560 (1932).
'" See Van Home v. Pacific Ref. & Roofing Co., 27 Cal. App. 105, 148
Pac. 951 (Dist. Ct. App. 1915), where an owner had installed piping prior
to certain work being done by the plaintiff who was later injured because of
faulty installation. The owner was held liable since he had the right to
control the piping at the time of the negligence.
"In all the cases defendant has been the holder of legal title to the in-
strumentality. See Wright v. Southern County Gas Co., 102 Cal. App. 656,
283 Pac. 823 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929); McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46
S.W.2d 557 (1932); Hart v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo.
App. 312, 118 S.W.2d 509 (1938). But the exception should apply equally
to cases where the defendant is a lessee, cestui que use, bailee, etc.
" The right to control theory has appeared in North Carolina only once
in a dissenting opinion by Clarkson, J., in Armstrong v. Acme Spinning Co.,
205 N.C. 553, 556, 172 S.E. 313, 314 (1934).
"As stated in a recent case, "'[I]t is not necessary that the instru-
mentality causing the injury be within the physical control of the person
sought to be held liable under the doctrine' ... . [I]t is only necessary that
the instrument be under the control of the defendant at the time of the negli-
gent act causing the injury." Haas v. Carrier Corp., 339 S.W.2d 727, 730
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960), 15 Sw. LJ. 464 (1961).
"24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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at the time of the accident." However, the plaintiff must show
that the condition of the instrumentality was not altered by inter-
vening forces." These two exceptions are the primary steps to the
final recognition of the fact that the requirement of control cannot be
strictly applied.
North Carolina has invented a unique exception to the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. The requirement of strict control by the de-
fendant at the time of the injury will be waived where the plaintiff
can show other "similar instances," i.e., that substantially similar
occurrences involving defendant's products have taken place within
a reasonable proximity in time.3 In the cases where this "similar
instances rule" has been applied res ipsa loquitur by name 7 has been
denied because defendant was not in control of the instrumentality
at the time of injury. The court allows the case to go to the jury
on the grounds that the similar instances are evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendant. However, the evidence remains cir-
cumstantial and the plaintiff need not prove defendant's specific
negligence.38
The rule recognized by the Fourth Circuit in the principal case
was first stated in North Carolina in 1841. 3" Since that time North
" Id. at 455, 150 P.2d at 438.
"Ibid. Accord Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 614, 140 P.2d 369
(1943); Dunn v. Hoffman Beverage Co., 126 N.J.L. 556, 20 A.2d 352 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1941).
" North Carolina's sister state to the south also seems to have been in-
clined to adopt this rule. Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 126
S.E.2d 178 (S.C. 1962).
", The distinction, if any, between the "similar instances" rule and res ipsa
loquitur is so tenuous and shadowy as to be insubstantial. "0 1 be some other
name: What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet.... " SHAKESPEARE, Romeo & idiet, Act II, Sc. ii, 1.
424.
" The rule as stated by Devin, J., in Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 228
N.C. 32, 34, 44 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1947), was: "As tending to show actionable
negligence on the part of the defendant, it is competent for plaintiff to show
that products produced by the defendant under substantially similar conditions
and sold by it at about the same time contained the same defects, such similar
instances being allowed to be offered as some evidence of defendant's
negligence at the time of plaintiff's injury 'when accompanied by proof of
substantially similar circumstances and reasonable proximity in time.'" See,
e.g., Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 175, 145 S.E. 14
(1928).
Under circumstances similar to those in Escola, plaintiff, injured by an
exploding bottle, was refused the right to plead res ipsa loquitur but allowed
to recover against the manufacturer on a pure negligence theory because he
could show other "similar instances." Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 239 N.C. 504, 80 S.E.2d 253 (1954).
" Ellis v. Portsmouth & R.R.R., 24 N.C. 138 (1841).
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Carolina has continued to limit the use of res ipsa loquitur to those
cases where the defendant is in control of the instrumentality at both
the times of negligence and injury.4" With the exception of the
"similar instances rule" there has been no deviation.4 In many of
the North Carolina cases control was no problem since the evidence
was quite conclusive as to whose negligence, if any, was the cause of
the injury.42 In other cases where the negligence was not so readily
laid to the defendant the court balked at expanding the use of the
control element as other jurisdictions have seen fit to do.4" Absent
the availability44 of the "similar instances rule," North Carolina has
refused to allow the use of the doctrine in the "exploding bottle"
cases where the plaintiff had possession of the bottle.4 5 The doctrine
has also been denied where foreign substances in packaged goods have
caused injury. The subject matter of these foreign substances has
run the gamut from fishhooks to mice,4" yet unless the defendant
has recently made the same mistake there has been no recovery. In
" E.g., where the defendant's boiler exploded killing the plaintiff's intestate
who was standing nearby, recovery was allowed on the theory of res ipsa
loquitur. Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235, 111 S.E. 177 (1922)."1But see Lane v. Dorney, 252 N.C. 90, 113 S.E.2d 33 (1960). The
court held res ipsa loquittir not applicable in a case concerning a skidding
automobile. It appeared from further language in the decision that the plain-
tiff was allowed recovery by offering negative circumstantial evidence of
defendant's negligence. It would appear that use of res ipsa loquitur in these
cases may become possible in the near future. For an excellent discussion of
this decision and its implications see Note, 39 N.C.L. Rav. 198 (1960).
"2 E.g., Jones v. Bland, 182 N.C. 70, 108 S.E. 344 (1921).
"' Compare the North Carolina view as stated in Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co., 256 N.C. 728, 125 S.E.2d 30 (1962), with the views stated in
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) and
Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d 601
(1941).
"'A circumstance more likely than not. It would be difficult to conceive
of a rule more conducive to wild imagination. Imagine the prospective plain-
tiff who has been told by his attorney that he will not have a case unless they
can uncover a witness who has also found a mouse in his bottled drink.
Plaintiff informs his friends of the state of the law. Suddenly everyone's
drink begins to taste strange. Fortunately, two days later plaintiff's nephew
finds what he believes to be a mouse in his drink. What a coincidence!
"' See Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 256 N.C. 728, 125 S.E.2d 30
(1962); Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 N.C. 504, 80 S.E.2d
253 (1954) ; Dail v. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284, 66 S.E. 135 (1909).
" Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E.2d 680
(1941) (fishhook in plug of chewing tobacco); Tickle v. Hobgood, 216 N.C.
221, 4 S.E.2d 444 (1939) (foreign substance in bottled drink); Enloe v.
Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 582 (1935) (dead
mouse in a bottled drink); Gill v. Ceases' Lunch System, Inc., 194 N.C. 803,
139 S.E. 925 (1927) (per curiam) (plaintiff's intestate died after eating at
defendant's lunch room); Lamb v. Boyles, 192 N.C. 542, 135 S.E. 464
(1926) (injurious substance in ale).
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other cases the opportunity to adopt a less stringent control rule was
foregone by questionable statements that our rigid requirement
was met.
47
In Schueler v. Good Friend N.C. Corp.48 North Carolina easily
disposed of a classic "collapsing chair" case using the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur simply by stating that our control requirement was
met.4" Yet who could actually contend that the defendant had any-
thing more than ownership without possession? In Eaker v. Inter-
national Shoe Co." an employee of the defendant was working a re-
volving drum to process hides. The employee stopped the drum,
reached inside, whereupon the clutch became engaged injuring him.
The court applied res ipsa loquitur against the defendant with no
discussion of control. The rule of strict control is strongly voiced in
North Carolina, but uniformity of its application is wanting.
In North Carolina res ipsa loquitur creates at most an inference
of negligence on the part of the defendant. 1  The burden of proof
remains on the plaintiff and does not shift to the defendant. "2 Under
such protection for the defendant a generous application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a whole and the control element in
particular could be allowed in this state. 3  A change would be
desirable in view of the problems of control just discussed. That
other jurisdictions have squarely faced these problems is evidenced
by the trend toward expansion of the control rule to encompass the
"' See Turner v. Southern Power Co., 154 N.C. 131, 69 S.E. 767 (1910).
Plaintiff was shocked when turning on an overhead light. Res ipsa loquitur
was held applicable even though a third party had furnished the appliances
for distributing the current to the different lamps. In McAllister v. Pryor,
187 N.C. 832, 123 S.E. 92 (1924), plaintiff was injured by high voltage
coming through her iron. Res ipsa loquitur was applied even though a third
party had attached the iron to the current.
48231 N.C. 416, 57 S.E.2d 324 (1950).
Compare the North Carolina view and the Rhode Island view discussed
in text accompanying note 9 supra.
80 199 N.C. 379, 154 S.E. 667 (1930).
Cl See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1938);
Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941). See generally
Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REv. 241
(1936).
" The party charged is merely required to go forward with the evidence
in an attempt to rebut the inference. The credibility of the evidence remains
with the jury and it may find for the defendant. Mitchell v. Saunders, 219
N.C. 178, 183, 13 S.E.2d 242, 246 (1941).
,5 For an excellent discussion of the evidentiary problems facing plaintiffs
in the area of inference, prima facie case, etc., see Note, 41 N.C.L. Rav. 124
(1962).
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difficulties of an advanced society. As our community continues'
to develop, the individuals of which it is composed become more
interdependant. This creates the necessity for liberality in the
field of law concerning liability for injuries caused by harmful in-
strumentalities. Early in the twentieth century the law of implied
warranties was forced to yield to the realities of modern life."4 The
time may now be ripe for a similar advance in the doctrines of implied
negligence. Where circumstantial evidence appears in such an
abundance as to show probable negligence of a defendant, it would
seem improper to remove a plaintiff from court solely on the ground
that he alone was in control of a harmful device. Although plaintiff
was in physical possession and perhaps had ownership, he may not
have had such control as would alter a hidden defect caused by the
defendant's negligence.
ARNOLD T. WOOD
Wills-Dissent Statute-Constitutionality of Husband's
Right to Dissent From Wife's Will
Prior to July 1, 1960 a husband could not by will deprive his
widow of her dower and other intestate rights in his estate if, pursu-
ant to the privilege given surviving wives by legislation originating
in 1784, she duly filed a dissent to his will.' On the other hand, no
right of dissent was extended to the husband, and his wife could
make a will disinheriting him from any share in her estate.'
The General Assembly at its 1959 session enacted new laws gov-
erning intestate succession by which the estates of dower and curtesy
were abolished.' Correlated sections permitted either husband or
wife to dissent from the will of the deceased spouse where the
survivor does not receive one-half or more in value of all the property
passing upon the death of the testator.4 The latter enactments were
" MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
'N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, §§ 37, 38. A history and explanation
of this legislation will be found in Hunter v. Husted, 45 N.C. 97 (1852).
2 Gomer v. Askew, 242 N.C. 547, 89 S.E.2d 117 (1955); Hallyburton v.
Slagle, 132 N.C. 947, 44 S.E. 655 (1903). See DOUGLAS, ADMINISTRATION
OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA §§ 18, 48, 158 (1948).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (Supp. 1961).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961). These sectiofs were re-
written and amended by the 1961 amendment, effective July 1, 1961, for the
most part in particulars not material here, except that the right of a surviving
spouse to dissent was limited by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (a) (Supp. 1961)
